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THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK 
REVIEW MODERNIZATION ACT: THE 
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF U.S. FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
J. Russell Blakey* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Operating behind closed doors, the Committee of Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS or the “Committee”) has 
always been somewhat mysterious. For four and a half decades, the 
Committee’s sole purpose has been to protect the United States from 
foreign investments and transactions with the potential to harm our 
nation’s national security. For those four and a half decades, the only 
thing that was certain regarding CFIUS’s review and investigatory 
process was what kind of investments and transactions it held 
jurisdiction over. Those days are now gone. 
With the passing and introduction of the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA or the “Act”), the 
Committee’s scope of review has transformed from something solid 
and tangible into something unrecognizable with a seemingly 
boundless jurisdictional capacity. This seemingly unending 
jurisdictional expansion stems from three phrases that lack any 
clarifying definition in FIRRMA: “critical infrastructure,” “critical 
technologies,” and “sensitive personal data.”1 This Note will unpack 
the Committee’s legislative history, analyze the past interpretation of 
 
 * J. D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, California 
State University, Fullerton, May 2015. I wish to give a special thanks to my family and friends for 
their never-ending support during law school and the members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review for their unparalleled support in pushing this Note through production and the countless 
laughs we all shared in the office. Most importantly, I want to thank Professor Therese Maynard, 
who not only played an essential role in this Note’s development, but also fostered an amazing 
learning environment as both an educator and a mentor. The world is irrefutably a better place 
because of Professor Maynard and the joy she brings to teaching.  
 1. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
§ 1703(a)(4)(B)(iii), 132 Stat. 1636, 2177–83. 
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CFIUS’s power and authority to block foreign investments and 
transactions, examine how FIRRMA will likely obscure all previously 
established notions of which types of future transactions will be 
subject to the Committee’s newly expanded reviewing powers, and 
ultimately question the likelihood of FIRRMA accomplishing what 
Congress designed it to do: protect U.S. national security interests. 
II.  THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A (LEGISLATIVE) HISTORY 
A.  Genesis 
On May 7, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 
11858, establishing CFIUS.2 The Committee was originally created to 
assist the President with issues found at the crossroads of national 
security and foreign investment.3 Pursuant to a Treasury Department 
memorandum published soon after the Committee’s formation, 
CFIUS was initially established as an inter-agency committee 
contained within the Treasury Department, designed to appease 
congressional concerns over increased foreign investments into 
American portfolio assets (notably Treasury securities, corporate 
stocks, and bonds) by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).4 Of course, much of this Congressional sentiment 
came as a result of the 1973 Oil Crisis.5 
On October 19, 1973, immediately following President 
Nixon’s request for Congress to make available $2.2 billion 
in emergency aid to Israel for the conflict known as the Yom 
Kippur War, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC)6 instituted an oil embargo on the United 
 
 2. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2016). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/International-
Affairs/Pages/cfius-index.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010). 
 5. Michael Corbett, Oil Shock of 1973–74, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74. 
 6. OPEC and OAPEC are pursuing similar objectives: 
[OPEC] was formed in Baghdad in 1960 with 12 member petroleum producing 
members including Arab and non-Arab countries. OPEC’s objective is to 
coordinate and unify petroleum policies among its member countries, and to 
identify best approaches to protect their individual and collective interests. The 
Organization seeks the optimal message to secure price stability in global market, 
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States (Reich 1995). The embargo ceased US oil imports 
from participating OAPEC nations, and began a series of 
production cuts that altered the world price of oil. These cuts 
nearly quadrupled the price of oil from $2.90 a barrel before 
the embargo to $11.65 a barrel in January 1974. In March 
1974, amid disagreements within OAPEC on how long to 
continue the punishment, the embargo was officially lifted.7 
In the wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis, this national security concern 
continued to grow as Congress worried that “much of the OPEC 
investments were being driven by political, rather than by economic, 
motives.”8 
Since its inception, the Committee’s primary goal has always 
been to monitor foreign investments and their potential implications 
on U.S. national security.9 More specifically, CFIUS’s operations 
have been statutorily directed, under executive order, to:  
(1) arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and 
significant developments in foreign investments in the 
United States;  
(2) provide guidance on arrangements with foreign 
governments for advance consultations on prospective major 
foreign governmental investments in the United States;  
(3) review investments in the United States which, in the 
judgment of the Committee, might have major implications 
for United States national interests; [and]  
(4) consider proposals for new legislation or regulations 
relating to foreign investment as may appear necessary.10  
As part of these four main statutorily imposed objectives, CFIUS also 
engages in a number of other more specific actions including: 
(1) obtaining, consolidating, and analyzing information on 
foreign investment in the United States; 
 
so as to eliminate address and [sic] unnecessary volatility. The Organization further 
endeavors to help member countries boosted [sic] their development plans by 
gaining fixed income from their exports. [OAPEC:] [f]rom the list of current 
OAPEC members seven are members of OPEC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, 
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Qatar.  
Frequently Asked Questions, ORG. ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, http://www.oape
corg.org/Home/FAQs (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 7. Corbett, supra note 5. 
 8. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 9. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. § 990 (1971–1975). 
 10. Id. 
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(2) improving the procedures for the collection and 
dissemination of information on such foreign investment; 
(3) the close observing of foreign investment in the United 
States; 
(4) preparing reports and analyses of trends and of significant 
developments in appropriate categories of such investment; 
(5) compiling data and preparing evaluation of significant 
transactions; and 
(6) submitting to the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States appropriate reports, analyses, data, and 
recommendations as to how information on foreign 
investment can be kept current.11 
Although these guiding principles provided a general outline of 
the Committee’s purpose and direction, much of CFIUS’s operations 
remained in general obscurity.12 “President Ford’s Executive Order 
also stipulated that information submitted ‘in confidence shall not be 
publicly disclosed’ and that information submitted to CFIUS be used 
‘only for the purpose of carrying out the functions and activities’ of 
the order.”13 This secrecy continues even today.14 Despite Congress’s 
desire for a committee capable of reviewing international investments, 
questions arose almost immediately after the Committee’s creation as 
to whether it was legally able to collect the information prescribed by 
Executive Order 11858.15 In order to reaffirm Congress of the 
Committee’s legality, President Ford signed the International 
Investment Survey Act in 1976, giving the President the “‘clear and 
unambiguous authority’ to collect information on ‘international 
investment.’”16 
 
 11. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 12. See id. at 1. 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. See Kevin Granville, Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html. 
 15. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 16. Id. at 2–3; see also International Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 4, 
90 Stat. 2059 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3101–3108) (“The President shall, to the extent 
he deems necessary and feasible . . . (3) study the adequacy of information, disclosure, and reporting 
requirements and procedures relating to international investment; recommend necessary 
improvements in information recording, collection, and retrieval and in statistical analysis and 
presentation relating to International investment; and report periodically to the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Commerce of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives on national and international developments with respect to laws and regulations 
affecting international investment . . . .”). 
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By 1980, only five years after the Committee’s creation, some 
members of Congress grew frustrated with CFIUS, arguing that it had 
failed to accomplish what it was intended to do.17 Those concerns 
stemmed from the Committee’s infrequent meetings, meeting only ten 
times in its first five years,18 and CFIUS’s narrow focus on the political 
implications of foreign investments rather than their overall economic 
benefit.19 In response, however, the Committee investigated several 
foreign investments in the following years, mostly at the request of the 
Department of Defense.20 Several of these investigations were 
primarily focused on its most prominent competitor at the time: 
Japan.21 As a result, CFIUS saw its first major legislative revision in 
1988: the Exon-Florio provision.22 
B.  The Exon-Florio Provision 
The Exon-Florio provision of 1988 provided a substantial 
increase in the discretionary authority of the executive branch to take 
whatever “action [the President] considers to be ‘appropriate’ to 
suspend or prohibit proposed or pending foreign acquisitions, mergers, 
or takeovers which ‘threaten to impair the national security.’”23 
However, this newly established power came with a catch: in order to 
use this power, the President must (1) find that “there is credible 
evidence . . . that the foreign interest exercising control might take 
action that threatens to impair the national security” and that (2) 
“provisions of law . . . do not in the President’s judgment provide 
adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect the 
national security in the matter before the President.”24 Surprisingly, 
“national security” was never specifically defined, but was generally 
interpreted in a broad manner.25 
 
 17. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (quoting The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and 
Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. 
on Gov’t Operations H.R., 96th Cong. 5 (1979) (statement of Mary P. Azevedo)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2901–2906) (passage of the Exon-Florio provision). 
 23. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22863, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CFIUS, 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2011),  
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS22863.pdf. 
 24. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 102 Stat. at 1425–26. 
 25. JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 2. 
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Ironically, just as Executive Order 11858 gave the executive 
branch the power to gather information required for CFIUS, the 
legislature grew wary of its own decision to push through the Exon-
Florio provision, believing “that the United States could not prevent 
foreign takeovers of U.S. firms unless the President declared a national 
emergency or regulators invoked federal antitrust, environmental, or 
securities laws.”26 Additionally, as a result of CFIUS and the Exon-
Florio provision, Congress faced the economic challenge of 
“balanc[ing] public concerns about the economic impact of certain 
types of foreign investment with the nation’s long-standing 
international commitment to maintaining an open and receptive 
environment for foreign investment.”27 
While the political and economic impact of the Exon-Florio 
provision remained relatively unclear, the direct implementation, 
specifically the time constraints of the provision, left little room for 
imagination.28 The provision established a three-step process for 
CFIUS’s review of qualifying foreign mergers, acquisition, and 
takeovers: (1) “CFIUS has 30 days to conduct a review;” (2) “45 days 
to conduct an investigation;” and (3) “then the President has 15 days 
to make his determination.”29 Pursuant to this provision, only the 
President has the ability to prohibit or bar foreign investments that fall 
within the Committee’s reviewing jurisdiction.30 
C.  The Byrd Amendment 
The Committee’s official power and jurisdiction was further 
expanded in 1992 as a result of what is commonly referred to as the 
Byrd Amendment.31 While the Byrd Amendment did not alter 
CFIUS’s original jurisdiction as established by Executive Order 
11858, it did act as a supplement to “the Exon-Florio statute through 
Section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 
§ 837(a)–(b), 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–64 (1992). 
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Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484),” balancing the President’s new greater 
discretionary power with additional hardline rules.32 
In response to the Exon-Florio provision giving greater 
discretionary power to the President, the Byrd Amendment mandated 
that the Committee must investigate and review certain investments, 
so long as those investments satisfy two distinct criteria: “(1) the 
acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government; 
and (2) the acquisition results in control of a person engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national 
security of the United States.”33 When these factors were met, the 
President’s duty to conduct a review of qualifying investments was 
triggered, mandating a compulsory investigation. This new 
requirement, however, did not displace the additional short-list of 
factors that the Exon-Florio provision provided to the President when 
“deciding to block a foreign acquisition,” merger, or takeover.34 This 
list included the following elements: 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national 
defense requirements; 
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet 
national defense requirements, including the availability of 
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other 
supplies and services; 
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial 
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and 
capacity of the U.S. to meet the requirements of national 
security; 
(4) the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of 
military goods, equipment, or technology to a country that 
supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or 
chemical and biological weapons; and . . . 
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. 
technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national 
security.35 
 
 32. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33312, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL 
SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8 (2013); see also National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(a)–(b), 106 Stat. at 2463–64. 
 33. JACKSON, EXON-FLORIO, supra note 32, at 8. 
 34. Id. at 17. 
 35. Id. 
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As a result of the Byrd Amendment, the Committee experienced its 
first noticeable power shift since its inception away from the executive 
branch and instead toward the legislature. Congress initiated this shift 
not by explicitly removing any authority from the executive branch, 
but rather by passing unambiguous legislation determining when a 
Committee investigation and review was required, irrespective of the 
President’s personal opinion as to its necessity. 
D.  The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
The final alteration to CFIUS’s review process prior to 
FIRRMA’s implementation was the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).36 This third amendment to the 
Committee’s oversight and the scope of CFIUS review was yet 
another example of Congress’s attempt at restructuring and 
reorganizing the balance of powers with respect to foreign investment 
oversight between Congress and the President. Addressing Congress’s 
concern that the Exon-Florio provision limited its own power in favor 
of granting the executive with more discretionary oversight 
concerning foreign investment, FINSA reasserted congressional 
power in two foundational ways: 
First, Congress enhanced its oversight capabilities by 
requiring greater reporting to Congress by CFIUS on the 
Committee’s actions either during or after it completes 
reviews and investigations and by increasing reporting 
requirements on CFIUS. Second, Congress fundamentally 
altered the meaning of national security in the Exxon-Florio 
provision by including critical infrastructure and homeland 
security as areas of concern comparable to national 
security.37 
While these two provisions reflect FINSA’s most notable 
changes, they were not the only changes the amendment created. 
FINSA required the Committee to investigate all transactions “[i]f the 
Committee determines that the covered transaction is a foreign 
government-controlled transaction,” meaning any “transaction that 
 
 36. See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 
246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170); JAMES J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 16 
(2013). 
 37. JACKSON, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 36, at 16. 
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could result in the control of any person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States by a foreign government or an entity 
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government.”38 
Additional changes required that the Director of National Intelligence 
conduct an independent and “thorough analysis of any threat to the 
national security of the United States posed by any covered 
transaction.”39 FINSA also provided the Committee and the President 
with additional factors to consider during their investigations, 
including the subject country’s adherence to nuclear nonproliferation 
control regimes (voluntary and nonbinding arrangements designed to 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and 
diplomatic history in cooperating with the United States in counter-
terrorism efforts.40 
Despite these amendments, congressional attitudes shifted with 
an increased sense of criticism regarding both the Exon-Florio 
provision and the Committee’s then-current effectiveness. Certain 
CFIUS scholars, most notably James K. Jackson, have argued that this 
increased criticism of the Exon-Florio provision originated from the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.41 Select members of Congress 
criticized the Committee’s “perceived lack of responsiveness,”42 and 
in February of 2006, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 
Strategic Affairs Richard Perle similarly described his disappointment 
with CFIUS, stating that “[t]he committee almost never met, and when 
it deliberated it was usually at a fairly low bureaucratic level . . . . I 
think it’s a bit of a joke [if we were serious about scrutinizing foreign 
ownership and foreign control, particularly since September 11.]”43 
This shift was most apparent in 2006 following what would come to 
be known as the Dubai Ports World Debacle. 
1.  The Dubai Ports World Debacle 
In October 2005, news surfaced over the mainstream media that 
Dubai Ports World (“DP World”) was interested in acquiring British-
owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, or P&O 
 
 38. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2, 121 Stat. at 246–52. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 4. 
 41. JACKSON, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 36, at 6. 
 42. JACKSON, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 3. 
 43. Political Backlash over Port Deal, CBS NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016, 9:11 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/political-backlash-over-port-deal/. 
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Ports (“P&O”).44 DP World was and continues to run as a major global 
port operator founded as a result of the 2005 merger of Dubai Ports 
Authority and Dubai Ports International,45 led by Dubai Sultan Ahmed 
bin Sulayem as its CEO.46 After a bidding war with Singapore’s 
government-owned Port of Singapore Authority, CFIUS approved DP 
World’s $6.8 billion bid for P&O.47 Among P&O’s assets, however, 
were container terminals in the ports of Baltimore, Miami, New 
Orleans, New York-New Jersey, and Philadelphia,48 sounding the 
alarm bell for several members of Congress.49  
Democrats like Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York 
warned that the port operations could be “infiltrated” by 
terrorists exploiting the ownership in Dubai, an emirate 
known for its open trade. Dubai had been the transfer point 
starting in the late 90’s for nuclear components shipped by 
the largest illicit nuclear technology network in the world.50 
DP World’s purchase of P&O also drew criticism in the press 
because of its potential effect on unsuspecting American businesses. 
At the time of DP World’s acquisition of P&O, a subsidiary of Eller 
& Co., a Florida cruise line firm,51 was partnered with P&O and was 
in the midst of resolving various contract issues.52 Eller & Co., 
however, found itself in a precarious situation: as a result of DP 
World’s successful acquisition of P&O, the firm would “become 
involuntarily a business partner with the government of Dubai.”53 
These concerns, combined with the ever-lingering security interests 
that naturally accompany a foreign government’s influence over vital 
U.S. ports, only increased congressional anxiety over the DP World-
 
 44. JULIO J. ROTEMBERG, THE DUBAI PORTS WORLD DEBACLE AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. rev. 2007). 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. See Board of Directors, DP WORLD, https://www.dpworld.com/who-we-are/leadership 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 47. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-company-
drops-port-deal.html. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Neil King Jr. & Greg Hitt, Small Florida Firm Sowed Seed of Port Dispute: Eller’s Suits 
and Lobbying Lie Behind Dubai Furor; Approval Delayed in U.K., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2006, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114105320594384271. 
 52. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4. 
 53. King & Hitt, supra note 51. 
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P&O merger. But these concerns, which were previously disregarded 
by the Committee, were precisely what provided the legislature with 
the traction needed to fight back. 
As the DP World deal grew increasingly unpopular and 
controversial in the public eye as a result of its national security 
implications, bipartisan congressional support grew for the insistence 
that the Committee conduct an investigation. “While on a fact-finding 
tour of ports, Senate majority leader Bill Frist (Republican, 
Tennessee) threatened to pass a law to put the deal on hold unless the 
White House initiated a more thorough 45-day CFIUS 
‘investigation.’”54 In opposition to Congress’s growing resistance to 
the deal, President George W. Bush increased his efforts to sway 
Republican Congress members to support the deal, all while 
maintaining that the merger posed no threat to American national 
security.55 In fact, on February 21, 2006, President Bush released a 
statement to the press, stating that “[i]f there was any chance that this 
transaction would jeopardize the security of the United States, it would 
not go forward.”56 
Irrespective of the White House’s support for the deal, what 
began as an enticing investment opportunity for DP World had 
blossomed into a public relations nightmare and international debate 
with the spotlight on DP World. Accordingly, DP World itself 
requested a forty-five-day CFIUS investigation in an attempt to calm 
any national security concerns and formally legitimize the 
transaction.57 At this point, however, lawmakers demanded more, 
insisting that the Committee’s report be provided to Congress and that 
Congress, not the White House, ultimately decide the final decision of 
either approving or barring DP World’s acquisition of P&O.58 As the 
resistance to the DP World-P&O merger continued to grow, “[t]he 
 
 54. ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.; Fact Sheet: The CFIUS Process and The DP World Transaction, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Feb. 22, 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-
11.html. 
 57. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, CFIUS Welcomes Dubai Ports Worlds 
Announcement to Submit to New Review (Feb. 26, 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/js4072.aspx. 
 58. See ROTEMBERG, supra note 44, at 4; see also David E. Sanger, Review of Port Deal Will 
Leave Decision to Bush, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2006),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/politics/review-of-port-deal-will-leave-decision-to-
bush.html. 
(9) 53.4_BLAKEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  12:34 PM 
992 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:981 
state-owned Dubai company seeking to manage some terminal 
operations at six American ports dropped out of the deal.”59 On 
December 11, 2006, DP World sold its U.S. holdings to the American 
insurance company, American International Group for an undisclosed 
price, finally bringing a bitter conclusion to the DP World debacle.60 
E.  Modern Chinese Investment 
More recently, as economic global powers shift, greater emphasis 
and attention has been placed on Chinese investments and the potential 
national security threats that come along with those investments. In 
2014 and 2015, Chinese investments represented the largest amount 
of CFIUS covered investments, with twenty-four and twenty-nine 
covered transactions, respectively.61 As Chinese investments 
continued to grow, a variety of different congressional committees 
began theorizing on how to preempt national security threats by re-
evaluating CFIUS’s role. 
“[O]n October 8, 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence published a report on ‘the counterintelligence and 
security threat posed by Chinese telecommunications companies 
doing business in the United States.’”62 This report specifically 
addressed the potential threat created by the acquisitions, takeovers, 
or mergers of American companies by Chinese telecommunication 
giants, most notably the Chinese government-owned Huawei and 
ZTE.63 
But telecommunication transactions by Chinese tech giants like 
Huawei and ZTE are not the only manner in which Chinese 
investments into the U.S. economy raise potential red flags. Chinese 
investments into the U.S. economy and technologies have also 
targeted startups through venture capitalist endeavors. Although 
 
 59. David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/under-pressure-dubai-company-
drops-port-deal.html. 
 60. Heather Timmons, Dubai Port Company Sells Its U.S. Holdings to A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/business/worldbusiness/12ports.html. 
 61. Memorandum from Latham & Watkins LLP on Overview of the CFIUS Process 4 (2017), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process. 
 62. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 31 (quoting MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, 
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI 
AND ZTE iv (2012), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:rm226yb7473/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf). 
 63. See id. 
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Chinese venture capitalist investments typically reflect private rather 
than governmental investment, these investments “still typically target 
firms in industries the government has prioritized as strategic, such as 
[artificial intelligence (AI)], autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, 
robotics, and blockchain technology.”64 According to research by the 
Defense Innovation Unit, a United States Department of Defense 
initiative, Chinese participation in U.S. venture-backed startups 
accounted for between 10 and 16 percent of global venture deals in the 
United States between 2015 and 2017 and has increased rapidly since 
2010.65 Between 2015 and 2017, China was the largest foreign source 
of equity investments in U.S. companies, investing a combined $24 
billion in U.S. venture-backed companies, or 13 percent of worldwide 
investment in the United States.66 Specifically regarding artificial 
intelligence technologies, “while China accounted for only 10% of 
global AI deals in 2017, Chinese AI startups took 48% of all AI 
funding dollars that year, surpassing the US in AI funding for the first 
time.”67 This increase in Chinese investment has also made the U.S. 
tech-economy the target of increasing levels of cyber espionage 
carried out by, or with the assistance of, the Chinese government.68 
According to James Lewis, a senior vice president at the Center for 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Strategic and 
International Studies, over the past two decades Chinese cyber 
espionage has likely cost the U.S. economy between $20 billion and 
$30 billion annually.69 These acts of cyber espionage do not only harm 
profit margins for affected intellectual property (IP) owners, but also 
pose a far larger theoretical threat to IP creators and the economy: the 
 
 64. SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, HOW CHINESE COMPANIES 
FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM THE UNITED STATES 6 (2019), 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%20Companies%20Facilitate
%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf; see also MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET 
SINGH, DEF. INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: 
HOW CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR TO 
ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 7–8 (2018), 
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf. 
 65. BROWN & SINGH, supra note 64, at 2. 
 66. Id. at 28. 
 67. China Is Starting to Edge Out the US in AI Investments, CBINSIGHTS (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups-tech/. 
 68. O’CONNOR, supra note 64, at 8. 
 69. James Andrew Lewis, How Much Have the Chinese Actually Taken?, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-much-have-
chinese-actually-taken. 
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unlawful access and utilization of “technical data, negotiating 
positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications.”70 
“For example, in October 2018 the U.S. Department of Justice 
indicted an official from China’s Ministry of State Security for 
economic espionage and attempting to steal trade secrets from GE 
Aviation, a subsidiary of General Electric, and other U.S. aviation and 
aerospace companies.”71 While economic threat accompanying the 
manipulation or outright theft of emerging technologies and 
intellectual property pose a very real and tangible problem, it is the 
technology’s use and its underlying information against the United 
States that encapsulates the heart of the Committee and its purpose. 
Similar issues were identified in a separate report published the 
following month by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission.72 This congressionally created commission was 
designed to “monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual 
report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and 
economic relationship between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where 
appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.”73 
The report explained more fundamentally where the threat lies in 
allowing foreign investments. “[S]ome observers argued that 
economic concerns focused on the possibility that state-backed 
Chinese companies choose to invest ‘based on strategic rather than 
market-based considerations,’ and are free from the constraints of 
market forces because of generous state subsidies.”74 This concept, 
similar to the OPEC transactions of the 1970s, set forth a variety of 
potential CFIUS amendments that would address the issue of Chinese 
investments and acquisition transactions:  
(1) requir[ing] a mandatory review of all controlling 
transactions by Chinese state-owned and state-controlled 
companies investing in the United States;  
 
 70. O’CONNOR, supra note 64, at 9. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2018). 
 73. U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n—Fact Sheet, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SECURITY 
REV. COMMISSION, https://www.uscc.gov/about/fact_sheet (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); see also 
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 
114 Stat. 1654 (2000). 
 74. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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(2) add[ing] a net economic benefit test to the existing 
national security test that CFIUS administers; and  
(3) prohibit[ing] investment[s] in a U.S. industry by a 
foreign company whose government prohibits foreign 
investment in that same industry.75 
Other suggested modifications to CFIUS included expanding its 
authority to evaluate and review “‘greenfield’ investments, or 
investments in new industrial plants and facilities.”76 Although 
Chinese investments remained the most problematic during this 
period, the concern over greenfield investments originated from 
Russian space agency Roscosmos’s interest in developing six Global 
Positioning System monitor stations throughout the United States.77 
This proposition was supported by the State Department, which saw it 
as potentially strengthening international relations, but was criticized 
by the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department, which 
feared Russia’s increased ability to spy more effectively on the United 
States.78 
Although the threat of Chinese investment into the United States 
economy has only continued to increase, no amendment to the scope 
of the Committee’s authority has ever explicitly addressed the issue 
underlying U.S.-Chinese transactions. But this fear nevertheless acted 
as the catalyst for the most recent legislative amendment to CFIUS’s 
jurisdiction: the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
of 2018. 
F.  The State of CFIUS and Its “Covered Transactions” 
Prior to FIRRMA 
Understanding CFIUS’s development, history, and evolving role 
over time is essential in distinguishing between its parameters 
regarding “covered transactions” prior to the passing of the Act and 
after the implementation of FIRRMA. For all “covered transactions,” 
or transactions that directly fall under the mandatory review of CFIUS, 
the Committee must “determine whether a transaction threatens to 
impair the national security, or the foreign entity is controlled by a 
foreign government, or it would result in control of any ‘critical 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 15–16. 
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infrastructure that could impair the national security.’”79 Under 
FINSA, “a ‘covered’ foreign investment transaction refers to any 
merger, acquisition or takeover which results in foreign control of any 
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”80 
As an inter-agency committee contained within its bounds, the 
Treasury Department also makes clear what transactions are not 
covered by CFIUS. First and foremost, all transactions that are merely 
for investment purposes only, or “an investment in which the foreign 
investor has ‘no intention of determining or directing the basic 
business decisions of the issuer,’” are affirmatively not transactions 
subject to the Committee’s review.81 Title 31 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations defines transactions that are solely for investment 
purposes by applying a two-part test: 
(1) Transaction that result in ownership of 10% or less of the 
voting securities of the firm; and 
(2) “investments that are undertaken directly by a bank, trust 
company, insurance company, investment company, pension 
fund, employee benefit plan, mutual fund, finance company, 
or brokerage company ‘in the ordinary course of business for 
its own account.’”82 
Other transactions not covered under CFIUS’s jurisdiction 
include: (1) “stock split[s] or pro rata stock dividend[s] that do[] not 
involve a change in control;” (2) “acquisition[s] of any part of 
an entity or of assets, if such part of an entity or assets do not 
constitute a U.S. business;” (3) “acquisition[s] of securities by 
a person acting as a securities underwriter, in the ordinary course of 
business and in the process of underwriting;” and (4) “an acquisition 
pursuant to a condition in a contract of insurance relating to fidelity, 
surety, or casualty obligations if the contract was made by an insurer 
in the ordinary course of business.”83 
 
 79. Id. at 16. 
 80. Memorandum, Baker Botts L.L.P. and U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program, A Guide 
to Demystify the CFIUS Process 5 (last visited June 2, 2020), http://docplayer.net/37687000-A-
guide-to-demystify-the-cfius-process-presented-by-baker-botts.html. 
 81. JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 16. 
 82. Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (a)–(f) (2018) (defining transactions that are not 
covered). 
 83. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (a)–(g) (2018) (defining transactions that are not covered); see also 
JACKSON, CFIUS, supra note 2, at 16. 
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Conceptually, distinguishing between CFIUS’s covered and non-
covered transactions is relatively easy to understand. What tends to 
complicate this determination is the more nuanced sub-issue as to what 
exactly qualifies as a “controlling” investment—an essential element 
for establishing CFIUS’s jurisdiction. While no numerical definition 
of “control” is provided by the Committee’s statute, the Treasury 
Department’s regulations do provide an expansive list of 
considerations that assist the Committee in evaluating how much 
“control” various foreign transactions result in. 
The term control means the power, direct or indirect, whether 
or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a 
dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in 
an entity, board representation,  proxy voting, a special share, 
contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements 
to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or 
decide important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but 
without limitation, to determine, direct, take, reach, or cause 
decisions regarding the following matters, or any other 
similarly important matters affecting an entity: 
(1) The sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of any 
of the tangible or intangible principal assets of the entity, 
whether or not in the ordinary course of business; 
(2) The reorganization, merger, or dissolution of the entity; 
(3) The closing, relocation, or substantial alternation of the 
production, operational, or research and development 
facilities of the entity; 
(4) Major expenditures or investments, issuances of equity or 
debt, or dividend payments by the entity, or approval of the 
operating budget of the entity; 
(5) The selection of new business lines or ventures that the 
entity will pursue; 
(6) The entry into, termination, or non-fulfillment by the 
entity of significant contracts; 
(7) The policies or procedures of the entity governing the 
treatment of non-public technical, financial, or other 
proprietary information of the entity; 
(8) The appointment or dismissal of officers or senior 
managers; 
(9) 53.4_BLAKEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  12:34 PM 
998 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:981 
(9) The appointment or dismissal of employees with access 
to sensitive technology or classified U.S. Government 
information; or 
(10) The amendment of the Articles of Incorporation, 
constituent agreement, or other organizational documents of 
the entity with respect to the matters described in paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (9) of this section.84 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any person holding 5 
percent or more of the publicly traded securities of a United States 
firm to report the acquisition of the shares to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.85 Similarly, Title 15 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, section 806.15 defines foreign direct investment control 
as “the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign 
person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an 
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including a branch.”86 
Ultimately, while these numbers can help assess the amount of 
influence a certain entity maintains over their investment, “control” 
nevertheless remains a relatively elusive term that shifts depending on 
who the investor is, what the investment covers, and the state of the 
current international relationship between the United States and the 
investor’s home country. Irrespective of the subjective nature 
surrounding “controlling” investments, it still remains the case that 
prior to FIRRMA’s 2018 introduction, the Committee only maintained 
review and investigation powers over “controlling” foreign 
investments.87 This distinction, however, would become irrelevant 
with the application of FIRRMA. 
III.  THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2018 
The most recent and arguably most revolutionizing expansion to 
CFIUS’s reviewing power and jurisdiction came from the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, or FIRRMA. 
 
 84. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 
Fed. Reg. 70,702, 70,718 (Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018). 
 86. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (2012). 
 87. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Proposed CFIUS Regulations to Implement 
FIRRMA 2 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Proposed-FIRRMA-
Regulations-FACT-SHEET.pdf. 
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The Act was passed in the Senate on August 1, 2018 and signed into 
law by President Donald J. Trump on August 13, 2018, becoming the 
first major overhaul to CFIUS operations in over a decade and marking 
a new era in regulating foreign investment in the U.S. economy.88 
While commonly described as an amendment designed to “close the 
gaps” that were previously exploitable under CFIUS’s scope, the 
general consensus is that “closing the gaps” is merely a euphemism 
for establishing more restrictions specifically targeting Chinese direct 
investments into the United States.89 
A.  FIRRMA Greatly Expands CFIUS’s Jurisdiction 
Prior to FIRRMA’s enactment, the Committee’s power to review 
certain foreign investments remained contingent on the level of 
control the purchaser would possess over the entity following the 
transaction: if the investment resulted in the investor receiving 
sufficient control of the U.S. entity or business, then CFIUS could 
review the transaction, but if it did not, the Committee had no authority 
to intervene on the proposed acquisition, merger, or takeover.90 
Following FIRRMA, however, the rules of the game had been changed 
quite profoundly, expanding the scope of the Committee’s regulatory 
review authority to cover both controlling and non-controlling 
investments. 
Under section 1703 of FIRRMA, “covered transactions” subject 
to CFIUS review were expanded to include both controlling and non-
controlling foreign investments, stirring debate concerning the Act’s 
general ambiguity as to where the scope of CFIUS’s regulatory review 
ends. The new parameters surrounding CFIUS covered transaction are 
as follows: 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided, the term 
‘covered transaction’ means— 
(i) any transaction described in subparagraph (B)(i); and 
 
 88. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
§§ 1701–1728, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174–2207. 
 89. See Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for 
Industry, WHITE & CASE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-
reform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry; Farhad Jalinous et al., How FIRRMA Changed 
National Security Reviews in 2018, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1111900/how-firrma-changed-national-security-reviews-in-2018. 
 90. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 87, at 2.  
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(ii) any transaction described in clauses (ii) through (v) of 
subparagraph (B) that is proposed, pending, or completed on 
or after the effective date set forth in section 1727 of the 
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 
2018. 
(B) TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.—A transaction described 
in this subparagraph is any of the following: 
(i) Any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or 
pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person 
that could result in foreign control of any United States 
business, including such a merger, acquisition, or takeover 
carried out through a joint venture. 
(ii) Subject to subparagraphs (C) and (E), the purchase or 
lease by, or a concession to, a foreign person of private or 
public real estate that— 
(I) is located in the United States; 
(II)(aa) is, is located within, or will function as part of, 
an air or maritime port; or 
(bb)(AA) is in close proximity to a United States 
military installation or another facility or property of the 
United States Government that is sensitive for reasons 
relating to national security; 
(BB) could reasonably provide the foreign person the 
ability to collect intelligence on activities being 
conducted at such an installation, facility, or property; 
or 
(CC) could otherwise expose national security activities 
at such an installation, facility, or property to the risk of 
foreign surveillance; and 
(III) meets such other criteria as the Committee 
prescribes by regulation, except that such criteria may 
not expand the categories of real estate to which this 
clause applies beyond the categories described in 
subclause (II). 
(iii) Any other investment, subject to regulations prescribed 
under subparagraphs (D) and (E), by a foreign person in any 
unaffiliated United States business that— 
(I) owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services 
critical infrastructure; 
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(II) produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, 
or develops one or more critical technologies; or 
(III) maintains or collects sensitive personal data of 
United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner 
that threatens national security.91 
While much of the covered transactions contained within section 
B(i) and B(ii) remained consistent with CFIUS’s earlier jurisdiction 
before FIRRMA, the center of the debate focuses on the text of section 
(B)(iii). Under this subsection, FIRRMA expands the Committee’s 
jurisdiction by opening the door to reviews concerning all 
transactions, controlling or non-controlling, that involve “critical 
infrastructure,” “critical technologies,” and the “sensitive personal 
data” of Americans.92 At first glance, this alteration to the scope of 
CFIUS review may seem inconsequential, but this revision to the 
Committee’s power has left many asking what these terms mean and 
how they will impact the Committee’s review capabilities.93 In order 
to comprehend the vast ambiguity surrounding the Committee’s newly 
established scope of review, it must first be understood exactly how 
FIRRMA defines, or utterly fails to define, “critical infrastructure,” 
“critical technologies,” and “sensitive personal data.” 
1.  “Critical Infrastructure” 
“Critical infrastructure,” as defined by the Act, refers to all 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets 
would have a debilitating impact on national security.”94 Despite the 
fact that this description could feasibly include almost anything 
depending on its interpretation, “this wording mirrors the language 
used in FINSA and by the Department of Homeland Security to 
describe the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors of the U.S. 
economy.”95 Those sixteen sectors include: 
- Chemical Sector 
 
 91. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(4), 132 Stat. at 
2177–78 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. § (a)(4)(B)(iii). 
 93. See Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law, supra note 89. 
 94. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(5), 132 Stat. at 
2181. 
 95. Michael Greshberg & Justin Schenck, The CFIUS Reform Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/26/the-cfius-
reform-bill/. 
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- Commercial Facilities Sector 
- Communications Sector 
- Critical Manufacturing Sector 
- Dams Sector 
- Defense Industrial Base Sector 
- Emergency Services Sector 
- Energy Sector 
- Financial Services Sector 
- Food and Agriculture Sector 
- Government Facilities Sector 
- Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
- Information Technology Sector 
- Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector 
- Transportation Systems Sector 
- Water and Wastewater Systems Sector.96 
Accordingly, it is likely that much of what will come under CFIUS 
review pursuant to FIRRMA will remain unchanged from what it was 
during the FINSA era. However, the following two categories, 
“critical technologies” and “sensitive personal data,” will prove to be 
far more elusive and likely expand the Committee’s jurisdiction 
beyond all prior understandings. 
2.  “Critical Technologies” 
The second major category left exposed for CFIUS review 
following the passing of FIRRMA is “critical technologies.” The Act 
defines “critical technologies” as follows: 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘critical technologies’ means the 
following: 
(i) Defense articles or defense services included on the 
United States Munitions List set forth in the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations under sub-chapter M of chapter 
I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations. 
(ii) Items included on the Commerce Control List set forth in 
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration 
Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, 
Code of Federal Regulations, and controlled— 
 
 96. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last updated Mar. 24, 2020). 
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(I) pursuant to multilateral regimes, including for 
reasons relating to national security, chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation, nuclear 
nonproliferation, or missile technology; or 
(II) for reasons relating to regional stability or 
surreptitious listening. 
(iii) Specially designed and prepared nuclear equipment, 
parts and components, materials, software, and technology 
covered by part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations 
(relating to assistance to foreign atomic energy activities). 
(iv) Nuclear facilities, equipment, and material covered by 
part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to 
export and import of nuclear equipment and material). 
(v) Select agents and toxins covered by part 331 of title 7, 
Code of Federal Regulations, part 121 of title 9 of such Code, 
or part 73 of title 42 of such Code. 
(vi) Emerging and foundational technologies controlled 
pursuant to section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act 
of 2018.97 
The crucial change here was the inclusion of “emerging and 
foundational technologies controlled pursuant to section 1858 of the 
Export Control Reform Act of 2018” (ECRA) in subsection (vi). 
ECRA, along with FIRRMA, were both contained within a larger 
legislative work, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA).98 “In Section 1758 of the NDAA, 
the ECRA authorized [Department of Commerce] to establish 
appropriate controls . . . on the export, re-export, or transfer (in 
country) of (1) emerging and (2) foundational technologies.”99 Apart 
from identifying these “emerging and foundational technologies,” the 
ERCA simultaneously required that the deliberation process also 
 
 97. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703(a)(6)(A), 132 Stat. at 
2181–82 (emphasis added). 
 98. See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018); Farhad Jalinous et al., Congress Finalizes CFIUS and Export 
Control Reform Legislation, WHITE & CASE (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/congress-finalizes-cfius-and-export-control-
reform-legislation. 
 99. Richard Burke et al., Department of Commerce Review of Export Controls on Emerging 
Technologies, WHITE & CASE (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/department-commerce-review-export-controls-
emerging-technologies. 
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consider “[t]he development of emerging and foundational 
technologies in foreign countries; [t]he effect export controls may 
have on the development of such technologies in the United States; 
and [t]he effectiveness of export controls on limiting the proliferation 
of emerging and foundational technologies in foreign countries.”100 
Arguably, this description of emerging and foundation 
technologies provides little to no more help than the definition 
contained within the text of FIRRMA when trying to understand 
exactly what the term “critical technologies” means. However, on 
November 19, 2018, the Bureau of Industry and Security published an 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“November ANPRM”) in the 
Federal Register that provided a proposed list of “representative 
technology categories” that would fall under CFIUS as “critical 
technologies.”101 Those categories include: 
(1) Biotechnology, such as: 
(i) Nanobiology; 
(ii) Synthetic biology; 
(iv) Genomic and genetic engineering; or 
(v) Neurotech. 
(2) Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technology, 
such as: 
(i) Neural networks and deep learning (e.g., brain modelling, 
time series prediction, classification); 
(ii) Evolution and genetic computation (e.g., genetic 
algorithms, genetic programming); 
(iii) Reinforcement learning; 
(iv) Computer vision (e.g., object recognition, image 
understanding); 
(v) Expert systems (e.g., decision support systems, teaching 
systems); 
(vi) Speech and audio processing (e.g., speech recognition 
and production); 
(vii) Natural language processing (e.g., machine translation); 
(viii) Planning (e.g., scheduling, game playing); 
(ix) Audio and video manipulation technologies (e.g., voice 
cloning, deepfakes); 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201, 58,202 
(Nov. 19, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 744). 
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(x) AI cloud technologies; or 
(xi) AI chipsets. 
(3) Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technology. 
(4) Microprocessor technology, such as: 
(i) Systems-on-Chip (SoC); or 
(ii) Stacked Memory on Chip. 
(5) Advanced computing technology, such as: 
(i) Memory-centric logic. 
(6) Data analytics technology, such as: 
(i) Visualization; 
(ii) Automated analysis algorithms; or 
(iii) Context-aware computing. 
(7) Quantum information and sensing technology, such as 
(i) Quantum computing; 
(ii) Quantum encryption; or 
(iii) Quantum sensing. 
(8) Logistics technology, such as: 
(i) Mobile electric power; 
(ii) Modeling and simulation; 
(iii) Total asset visibility; or 
(iv) Distribution-based Logistics Systems (DBLS). 
(9) Additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing); 
(10) Robotics such as: 
(i) Micro-drone and micro-robotic systems; 
(ii) Swarming technology; 
(iii) Self-assembling robots; 
(iv) Molecular robotics; 
(v) Robot compliers; or 
(vi) Smart Dust. 
(11) Brain-computer interfaces, such as 
(i) Neural-controlled interfaces; 
(ii) Mind-machine interfaces; 
(iii) Direct neural interfaces; or 
(iv) Brain-machine interfaces. 
(12) Hypersonics, such as: 
(i) Flight control algorithms; 
(ii) Propulsion technologies; 
(iii) Thermal protection systems; or 
(iv) Specialized materials (for structures, sensors, etc.). 
(9) 53.4_BLAKEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  12:34 PM 
1006 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:981 
(13) Advanced Materials, such as: 
(i) Adaptive camouflage; 
(ii) Functional textiles (e.g., advanced fiber and fabric 
technology); or 
(iii) Biomaterials. 
(14) Advanced surveillance technologies, such as: Faceprint and 
voiceprint technologies.102 
Following the publication of the November ANPRM, the “critical 
technologies” category experienced a shift from what was once an 
unclear and theoretical concept that left prospective investors 
scratching their heads to now a comprehensively defined list 
consisting of several of the most cutting-edge scientific investment 
opportunities. The November ANPRM, however, was conscious of 
the list’s potential chilling effect on foreign investment, stating that 
“[r]esponses to this ANPRM will help [the Department of] Commerce 
and other agencies identify and assess emerging technologies for the 
purposes of updating the export control lists without impairing 
national security or hampering the ability of the U.S. commercial 
sector to keep pace with international advances in emerging fields.”103 
Even more troubling than the potentially vast CFIUS coverage 
stemming from FIRRMA was the fact that the Committee’s operations 
and review still remained secretive, conducted behind closed doors. 
There is no case law or open hearing process that provides prospective 
foreign investors with a benchmark to determine whether their 
investments will be covered by the Committee. All that is made public 
are the select transactions that are publicly announced to be under the 
Committee’s review and the news of the subsequent decision that 
accompanies the CFIUS investigation. While it is safe to say most 
transactions being reviewed by the Committee will not be nearly as 
colossal as this one, easily the most notable transaction scrutinized by 
CFIUS following FIRRMA’s passing was Broadcom’s attempted 
$117 billion acquisition of Qualcomm.104 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. See Peter Henderson, President Trump Halts Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, REUTERS 
(Mar. 12, 2018, 6:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-
merger/president-trump-halts-broadcom-takeover-of-qualcomm-idUSKCN1GO1Q4. 
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a.  The Broadcom-Qualcomm saga: A tale of two microchip giants 
President Trump’s opinion of Broadcom was not always one of 
suspicion. In November 2017, President Trump praised Broadcom as 
“one of the really, great, great companies” after CEO Hock Tan 
announced Broadcom’s plan to relocate its legal headquarters out of 
Singapore and into the United States for tax purposes.105 Friendlier tax 
rates, however, was not the only reason for this move; only a few days 
later, “Mr. Tan announced that his company had offered to buy another 
major chip maker, Qualcomm, for $105 billion, in what would be the 
biggest takeover in the history of the technology industry.”106 
Qualcomm, based in San Diego, California, is a technology giant, 
manufacturing digital wireless communication devices.107 Having 
traditionally relied on a mixture of both microchip sales and patent 
licensing to garner profits, “the latest plan show[ed] Qualcomm 
leaning heavily on its chip side for future growth.”108 More 
specifically, Qualcomm is a “leading company in so-called 5G 
technology development and standard setting,” competing closely 
with China’s Huawei Technologies Co.109 As a leader in American 5G 
communications research, the Committee was immediately alerted by 
Broadcom’s announcement, fearing that “Broadcom would starve 
Qualcomm of research dollars that would allow it to compete.”110 
CFIUS’s investigation was also the result of U.S military concerns 
regarding Broadcom’s relationship with “third party foreign entities,” 
less cryptically known as Huawei.111 In the U.S. military’s opinion, if 
Broadcom’s acquisition of Qualcomm was successful, “within 10 
years, ‘there would essentially be a dominant player in all of these 
technologies and that’s essentially Huawei, and then the American 
 
 105. Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Targets Qualcomm in Largest-Ever Tech Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/business/dealbook/broadcom-
qualcomm-merger.html. 
 106. Id. 
 107. QUALCOMM Inc (QCOM US Equity), BLOOMBERG L., 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/company/ticker/QCOM%20US%20Equity (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020). 
 108. Dan Gallagher, Qualcomm Stacks All Its Chips on 5G, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:49 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-stacks-all-its-chips-on-5g-
11574261397?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4. 
 109. Henderson, supra note 104. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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carriers would have no choice. They would just have to buy Huawei 
(equipment).’”112 
By CFIUS stepping in to intervene and prevent Broadcom’s bid 
on the basis of national security, the Committee safeguarded 
Qualcomm’s sizable market share of the 5G global market and 
preserved Qualcomm’s control of its essential 5G patents 
(approximately 15 percent of the world’s essential 5G patents).113 That 
being said, Huawei remains the major 5G force in China, which is 
expected to become the world’s leading 5G market, amassing an 
estimated one-third of all 5G network users.114 Apart from firmly 
holding the market in China, Huawei has also increased its 
commercial market-share in “several lucrative markets, including 
countries that are longstanding U.S. allies.”115 With all that in mind, 
the decision to halt and review this transaction was based upon the 
relatively obvious implications of the purchase and its likely effect on 
U.S. national security.116 President Trump’s decision to block 
Broadcom’s bid for Qualcomm revealed a rare moment in his 
administration receiving praise on both sides of the political aisle; 
“Senator Chuck Schumer, the top Democrat in the U.S. Senate, praised 
Trump’s decision, calling China’s trade practices ‘rapacious.’”117 
While much can be learned from Broadcom’s attempted 
acquisition of Qualcomm, it still leaves much to the imagination for 
foreign investors, especially considering that the vast majority of 
foreign investment into U.S. “critical technologies” will be noticeably 
smaller than what would have literally been the largest technology 
merger of all time.118 And despite the list provided from the November 
ANPRM, investors will often have to simply wait and see if their 
investment into these emerging technologies flags the interest of the 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Eric Auchard & Stephen Nellis, What Is 5G and Who Are the Major Players?, REUTERS 
(Mar. 15, 2018, 4:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-5g/what-
is-5g-and-who-are-the-major-players-idUSKCN1GR1IN. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Eric Auchard & Sijia Jiang, China’s Huawei Set to Lead Global Charge to 5G Networks, 
REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5g-
china/chinas-huawei-set-to-lead-global-charge-to-5g-networks-idUSKCN1G70MV. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Shravanth Vijayakumar et al., Timeline: Broadcom-Qualcom Saga Comes to an Abrupt 
End, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-
broadcom-timeline/timeline-broadcom-qualcomm-saga-comes-to-an-abrupt-end-
idUSKCN1GQ22N. 
 118. See de la Merced, supra note 105. 
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executive branch or the Committee. According to the Rhodium Group, 
an independent research provider specializing in economic data and 
policy insights, “15-25% of Chinese venture deals will be reviewable 
under the new regime, but if a broad definition is adopted, that could 
rise to 75% of deals.”119 
On the other hand, Silicon Valley startups receiving foreign 
Chinese investments have also begun to grow wary of the once 
welcomed Chinese financial backing.120 Previously, entrepreneurs 
welcomed Chinese money as the Chinese investors often agreed to 
higher valuations in exchange for access to the deal.121 Occasionally, 
startup entrepreneurs were not even aware of the fact that their capital 
came from Chinese investors “because China’s sovereign, provincial 
and local governments, state-owned enterprises, firms and individual 
investors often form their own funds and pool their money in each 
other’s investment vehicles,” all under the guise of Western-sounding 
names, such as Westlake Ventures.122 As a result, those startups that 
continued to accept more Chinese backing have recently begun to feel 
the pressure resulting from the ever-escalating tech-arms race between 
the United States and China. One entrepreneur recently commented on 
the impact of unknowingly accepting Chinese money from Danhau 
Capital, a Chinese venture-capital firm based near Stanford 
University: “You’re going in blind. If there are issues down the line 
you may not know who you’re dealing with.”123 But despite all this, 
foreign investment, specifically from China, continues to provide 
capital, albeit at a declining rate, for numerous smaller, minority 
investments into new startups still focused on what has clearly now 
been defined as “critical technologies” pursuant to the November 
ANPRM.124 
Regardless of its size, it is safe to say that if any lesson is learned 
from the Broadcom-Qualcomm saga, it is this: any major investment 
 
 119. Silicon Valley Gets Queasy About Chinese Money, ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/09/silicon-valley-gets-queasy-about-chinese-
money. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Burke et al., supra note 99; see also Thilo Hanemann et al., Net Negative: Chinese 
Investment in the US in 2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 13, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/chinese-
investment-in-the-us-2018-recap/ (describing a noticeable lowering in Chinese investment into tech 
startups following the passing of FIRRMA). 
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that will likely give China, or nations closely associated with China, 
an upper hand on what the U.S. military finds vital to national security 
will most certainly catch the Committee’s attention and likely be 
blocked. What lingers is discovering what that means for American 
startups in the future. How broadly will “critical technologies” be 
defined and applied by CFIUS? Will the Chinese continue to invest, 
but more selectively? If not, where else will that money go, possibly 
marking the beginning of a new Silicon Valley far from American 
shores? This balance of both encouraging investment into the U.S. 
tech-economy and simultaneously rejecting certain investments 
deemed problematic by CFIUS will likely have FIRRMA’s desired 
effect: blocking Chinese investments that pose a threat to U.S. national 
security. But the long-term consequences of FIRRMA may likely 
extend beyond its initial purpose. 
3.  “Sensitive Personal Data” 
Third and most ambiguous of the newly included FIRRMA 
categories concerns the “sensitive personal data” of all Americans.125 
Unlike other amendments to CFIUS’s review scope, neither “sensitive 
personal data,” nor any variation of the term, has ever been referenced 
by CFIUS standards before, essentially equating this term to unknown 
territory for foreign investors. This text was added late in the 
legislative process following the House’s request for its inclusion, so 
naturally, absolutely no formal definition was provided for what 
actually constitutes “sensitive personal data.”126 As a primer to inform 
investors on what it could mean, the Treasury Department did provide 
this description: 
Sensitive personal data: CFIUS may review transactions 
related to U.S. businesses that maintain or collect sensitive 
personal data of U.S. citizens that may be exploited in a 
manner that threatens national security. “Sensitive personal 
data” is defined to include ten categories of data maintained 
or collected by U.S. businesses that (i) target or tailor 
products or services to sensitive populations, including U.S. 
 
 125. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 
1703(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III), 132 Stat. 1636, 2177–78. 
 126. David R. Hanke, CFIUS 2.0: ‘Sensitive Personal Data’ in the National Security Context, 
ARENT FOX LLP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/cfius-20-sensitive-
personal-data-national-security-context. 
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military members and employees of federal agencies 
involved in national security, (ii) collect or maintain such 
data on at least one million individuals, or (iii) have a 
demonstrated business objective to maintain or collect such 
data on greater than one million individuals and such data is 
an integrated part of the U.S. business’s primary products or 
services. The categories of data include types of financial, 
geolocation, and health data, among others. Genetic 
information is also included in the definition regardless of 
whether it meets (i), (ii), or (iii).127 
Despite the Treasury Department’s attempt to resolve initial 
questions regarding the meaning of “sensitive personal data” and, of 
course, to be consistent with “critical infrastructure” and “critical 
technologies,” “sensitive personal data” is seemingly as vast a term as 
those interpreting it are willing to go. It should be noted, however, that 
FIRRMA’s use of “sensitive personal data” does depart from the more 
standard term “personally identifiable information,” and many believe 
that this was a deliberate move, viewing “sensitive personal data” as 
another means to further extend the Committee’s reviewing scope.128 
While the two likely have some overlap, drawing the distinguishing 
line will likely be challenging for foreign investors. “Sensitive 
personal data” may include “personally identifiable information,” 
such as one’s social security number or educational history, but the 
former may also cover information that has traditionally not been 
associated with “personally identifiable information,” such as an 
individual’s biometric information or internet history and social media 
data.129 Ultimately, what’s most troubling about this category is that 
there simply are no supplemental materials, other than the Treasury 
Department’s statement, that provide any basis on how CFIUS will 
interpret this section of FIRRMA or enforce it. Accordingly, foreign 
investors are left with two options: either wait for further instructions 
on exactly which types of transactions are likely to be flagged under 
FIRRMA or continue on ahead, risking that their investment might be 
terminated by the Committee.130 
 
 127. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 87, at 3. 
 128. Hanke, supra note 126. 
 129. Id. 
 130. This Note does not address the Treasury Department’s final two regulations regarding the 
implementation of FIRRMA and the Committee’s reviewing power. These regulations were 
introduced immediately prior to the publication of this Note and, accordingly, the author was unable 
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IV.  THE OBSCURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS UNDER FIRRMA 
At its outset, this Note analyzed CFIUS’s legislative history and 
examined the jurisdictional implications that FIRRMA would have on 
the Committee, but the most important, and yet unresolved, question 
is whether this Act will truly assist in furthering the legislative goal of 
FIRRMA: enhancing protection of U.S. national security interests. In 
addressing this issue, however, the question must be broken into two 
parts: how will FIRRMA impact U.S. national security in the short 
term and in the long term? 
As far as the short-term effects of FIRRMA go, there are certain 
benefits to CFIUS’s ability to reject certain mergers, acquisitions, and 
takeovers that it finds issue with, assuming it has the bandwidth and 
personnel needed to review all the transactions it desires. Years of 
international relations or national security experience are not 
necessary to generally understand the potential implications that the 
Broadcom-Qualcomm acquisition could have posed to U.S. national 
security, but transactions of this magnitude are obvious and 
conspicuous. 
The Achilles’s heel of FIRRMA, however, is embedded within 
its long-term effect: if broad definitions of “critical infrastructure,” 
“critical technologies,” and especially “sensitive personal data” are 
adopted by the Committee resulting in more and more blocked foreign 
investments, investors will simply go elsewhere. And as a result, the 
likely departure of U.S. technological innovation to distant shores may 
ultimately endanger U.S. national security interests to an even greater 
extent than the investments FIRRMA was designed to block.131 
Despite Silicon Valley being the uncontested leader in the tech 
world, other regions are rising to the challenge. “Of 63 private 
companies reaching ‘unicorn’ valuations of $1B+ [during 2018], 38—
or nearly two-thirds—of them came from outside the US.”132 From 
January 2012 to May 2018, Silicon Valley received $140 billion in 
 
to provide a full analysis of these newly presented regulations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Treasury Releases Final Regulations to Reform National Security Reviews for Certain 
Foreign Investments and Other Transactions in the United States (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm872. 
 131. Steve Croley et al., How FIRRMA Changes the Game for Tech Cos. and Investors, 
LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090123/how-firrma-
changes-the-game-for-tech-cos-and-investors. 
 132. Marcelo Ballvé, Silicon Valley’s Competition, CBINSIGHTS (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/silicon-valleys-competition/ (emphasis added). 
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fundraising for tech startups, but Beijing and Shanghai received a 
combined $95 billion.133 Despite Silicon Valley being the reigning 
champion of the global tech-economy, Asia’s rise is undeniable as it 
becomes the focus of early-stage startups entering the market, 
consistently receiving substantial dollar investments with most of this 
funding and growth being allocated to Chinese startups.134 
Not only does Asia have the technological know-how to assist 
and foster these companies, but there are often other “nuts and bolts” 
factors that make operating out of Asian markets more feasible for 
fledgling tech-companies, most notably real estate.135 When it comes 
to deciding between housing in either Silicon Valley or Beijing, 
Beijing’s economic advantage is irrefutable. Given that the medium 
price for a home in the San Francisco Bay Area is a staggering 
$940,000, Ajay Royan of investment fund Mithril Capital put it best: 
“How are you supposed to have a startup in a garage if the garage costs 
millions of dollars?”136 
CFIUS, with all of its amendments expanding its reviewing scope 
since its original enactment in 1975, has always been reactionary, 
following unanticipated shifts in the economy and national security. 
For four and a half decades, CFIUS has been playing a never-ending 
game of catch up with whatever it perceives as a threat to U.S. national 
security interests. But despite its best efforts and good intentions, 
FIRRMA may have gone too far. In an attempt to halt China’s ever-
increasing investments into emerging technologies in the United 
States, FIRRMA may currently be viewed as a shield protecting 
against such investments but is likely to manifest itself as a double-
edged sword. While FIRRMA will undoubtedly fend off investments 
that are likely accompanied by suspicious Chinese motives, at the 
same time it is also likely to divert future funding for America’s tech-
economy and, in an ironic twist, send prized future innovation to the 
very shores it was designed to withhold that technology from. The 
only entity that can truly determine the Committee’s fate is the 
Committee itself, especially regarding its decision as to how exactly 
 
 133. Global Tech Hubs, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/global-
tech-hubs/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Silicon Valley Is Changing, and Its Lead Over Other Tech Hubs Narrowing, 
ECONOMIST (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/09/01/silicon-valley-is-
changing-and-its-lead-over-other-tech-hubs-narrowing. 
 136. Id. 
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“critical infrastructure,” “critical technologies,” and “sensitive 
personal data” will be defined. After all, the interpretation of these 
terms will determine the jurisdictional scope of the Committee going 
forward, and subsequently, affect the willingness of foreign investors 
to enter U.S. markets. In the end, as the old saying goes, only time will 
tell. 
